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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLENN BASS and LOIS BASS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
Case No. 19,182
MAJESTIC MEADOWS, a Limited
partnership, dba MAJESTIC
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages from defendants
for alleged conspiracy by defendants to dispossess
plaintiffs of their mobile home and personal property.
Plaintiffs also claimed unlawful and forcible entry,
unlawful detainment of possession, and false and malicious
statements about plaintiffs' mobile home.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Christine M.
Durham on Wednesday and Thursday/ January 6 and 7, 1982.
Co-defendants Floyd and Evelyn Trimble were not present at
the trialf nor did they respond to the complaint, and were,
therefore, found to be in default. The claim against
defendant Spilker was settled for a nominal fee of $1.00.
During the trial the charge of conspiracy was dismissed,
there being insufficient evidence.
On February 1, 1982 judgment was entered against
defendants. The trial court found that defendants Trimble
wrongfully forfeited their contract with the plaintiffs. It
also found that defendant Planned Management Services, Inc.
(hereinafter PMS), manager of Majestic Meadows Mobile Home
Park, was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for the actions of its employee, defendant Spilker. Spilker
was found to have slandered plaintiffs1 title to the mobile
home and to have committed trespass and forcible entry. PMS
was held liable for the reasonable rental value of the
mobile home for the period of trespass (10 days), and for
attorney's fees for slander of title, although the court
found no actual damages by reason of such slander.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant PMS seeks a reversal of the lower court's
decision and a judgment in favor of PMS, of no cause of
action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
About the middle of October, 1976, plaintiffs and
defendants Trimble entered into an agreement, whereby
plaintiffs leased the Trimbles1 mobile home with an option
to buy. (r.209-10, 344, 392) The contract was to terminate
as of October 31, 1978. (r. 496) A short time thereafter,
the plaintiffs moved the mobile home into Majestic Meadows
Mobile Home Park. (r. 215-18)
During the following eighteen months bad feelings
developed between the plaintiffs and defendant Spilker over
the plaintiffs' alleged failure to comply with some rules
and regulations of the mobile home park. (r. 234, 419-20)
Repeated violations of the park's rules led to a notice of
termination on May 24, 1978 (r. 239-40) and a legal action
for restitution in June. On August 18, 1978 a writ of
restitution was issued by Judge Maurice D. Jones of the
Fifth Circuit Court, (r.379, 489-90, 492) Two days before,
on August 16, the plaintiffs engaged the services of Mr.
Raymond W. Neidert, a real estate agent, to sell the mobile
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home. (r. 358) The plaintiffs then remained in the mobile
home until sometime around the 4th of October 1978. (r. 386)
Sometime during the summer months of that year,
defendants Trimble somehow (the facts are in dispute) became
aware of the plaintiffs being in arrears in their payments
on the mobile home. (r. 256, 392, 460-461) Within a short
time thereafter, defendants Trimble engaged an attorney to
handle the matter for them since they lived at that time in
North Dakota, (r. 310) Upon notification of the situation
the plaintiffs contacted the Trimblefs attorney and offered
him payment in the form of a check, (r. 213-14) In
attempting to certify the check, the attorney testified that
the plaintiffs1 bank told him there were insufficient funds
to cover the check, (r. 315-16) By mid-October the
plaintiffs were still in arrears. During this time
defendants Trimble had made at least two trips to Utah and
had visited defendant Spilker and informed him that they
intended to repossess the mobile home if payments were not
made by the plaintiffs, (r. 463)
About mid-October 1978, after the plaintiffs had
vacated the home, Spilker became concerned about the
possible theft of some of the plaintiffs1 personal property
which had been left in open view. (r.438-40) Spilker
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discussed his concerns with PMS's attorney, Robert Baldwin,
who was aware of the forthcoming repossession and had been
in contact with the Trimble's attorney. After clearance from
PMSfs attorney, Spilker moved plaintiffs' property into the
mobile home and changed the locks on October 20, 1978.
(r.438-40,488)
By October 31, 1978 the plaintiffs had failed to
exercise their option to purchase; on this date the contract
between defendants Trimble and the plaintiffs expired under
its own terms, and defendants Trimble repossessed the mobile
home. In letters dated November 10, 1978, the Trimble's
attorney notified the plaintiffs and their attorney that the
terms of their agreement had expired and that the mobile
home had been repossessed, (r. 324, 346) Four days prior, on
November 6, 1978, Trimbles wrote Spilker a letter in which
they notified him of their repossession of the mobile home
and in which they asked him to list the mobile home for sale
at $28,500. (r. 452) Spilker found a buyer for the mobile
home shortly thereafter, (r. 353)
During the trial the plaintiffs' real estate agent, Mr.
Neidert, claimed that Spilker had harassed him in his
attempts to sell the mobile home and discouraged buyers from
purchasing the mobile home. (r. 370, 372, 380) Defendant
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Spilker testified that he only told prospective buyers that
there were some legal uncertainties about the mobile home,

/

and that these legal questions would need to be resolved
before a purchase of the mobile home could be complete.
(r. 443, 447, 457)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING SLANDER OF TITLE, THE
PLAINTIFFS HAVING FAILED TO PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR
SLANDER OF TITLE.
In defining slander of title the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has said:
Slander of title of property may be
committed and published orally or by writing,
printing, or otherwise, and the gist of the
action is the special damage sustained; and,
unless the plaintiff shows the falsity of the
words published, the malicious intent with which
they were uttered, and a pecuniary loss or
injury to himself, he cannot maintain the
action. If the alleged infirmity of the title
exists, the action will not lie, however
malicious the intent to injure may have been,
because no one can be punished in damages for
speaking the truth. Cardon v. McConnell, 120
N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897).
There are then, essentially four elements of slander of
title: (1) Words actually affecting title; (2) Falsity; (3)
Malice; (4) Special damages. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 116
Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956 (1949); McNichols v. Conejos-k
Corp., 482 P.2d 432 (Colo. App., 1971) at 434.
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A. TITLE.
In slander of title cases, it is obviously the
plaintiff's burden to prove possession of title to the
alleged slandered property, and to prove that title has been
clouded by the defendant's statements. Dowse v. Doris Trust
Co., supra; South Louisiana Land Co. v. Riggs Cypress Co.,
119 La. 193, 43 So. 1003 (1907).
In the instant case the only evidence of title offered
was an undated, handwritten Private and Personal Agreement
between defendants Trimble and plaintiffs. Further evidence
might have been submitted had title been an issue in the
case. However, since slander of title was never plead, and
in fact was never mentioned in the pleadings or during the
course of the trial, no evidence to prove this particular
point was ever submitted.
In regards to any cloud having been placed upon the
plaintiffs' title, absolutely no evidence was offered by the
plaintiffs to show that their title had been clouded by
defendant Spilker's statements.
B. FALSITY.
" [I]f the alleged defamatory matter is true, an action
will not lie, however malicious the intent to injure may
have been." 50 Am. Jur. 2d 1067, Libel and Slander,

7
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section 549. "For one to be liable for slander of title he
must publish matter which is untrue and disparaging to
another's property in land." Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d
328, 265 P.2d 644, 649, (1954).
As to the truthfulness of defendant Spilker's
statements the trial court found that he

If

[m]ade false

statements to...at least one person (Doan) interested in
purchasing the property and to the plaintiffs' real estate
agent." (r. 121) No person named Doan ever testified at
trial. However, the plaintiffs' real estate agent, Mr.
Neidert, did mention someone named Dos or Don, but he never
testified that any false statements had been made:
Q. Okay. Did you have occasion to be
thwarted in any of your efforts, from your
standpoint, in the sale of the home?
A. As I understand it, the park reserves
the right to okay or not okay somebody that
wanted to buy the place. And I can't recall any
names. At the time I didn't — you know. Had I
known it was going to happen, we would have kept
records. I don't know who these people were
other than the people across the street. Do you
want me to get into that?
Q. Yes. I am trying to elicit that.
A. Yeah. We had some other people that were
really interested. That was my understanding.
But it was my understanding when they got back
to me that the manager didn't want them in
there.
Q. All right.

8
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A. Or he didnft want us to sell it. That
was the biggest problem. But that Dosf or Don,
who lived across the street, was really
interested, and he too was told by the
management —
Mr. Fillerup: I need foundation, (r.
363-64)
Mr. Fillerup, defendant PMS's counsel, then objected on the
basis that Neidert's recitation of what someone else may
have told him about what Spilker may have told them was
hearsay; and, after after a lengthy argument, plaintiffs1
counsel dropped the question with no evidence of any alleged
false statements being received, (r.364-68)
Mrs. Bass, a plaintiff in this action, testified that
she overheard a conversation between Neidert, Spilker, and
the neighbors from across the street, the Daubs (r. 405,
412), in which Spilker told the Daubs there were legal
problems with the mobile home. Mrs. Bass never testified
Spilker said anything that affected their title to the
mobile home, only that there were legal problems.
Spilker also testified about a conversation with a Mr.
Daub (r. 467-69), another resident of the park who wanted to
purchase the plaintiffs1 mobile home below market value and
then have Spilker sell the home at market value for a large
profit.

Defendant Spilker's testimony about this

conversation and his refusal to be a party to such a scheme
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contains nothing about the plaintiffs1 title to the mobile
home, let alone anything that might be considered as a false
statement regarding the mobile home.
Whether the person to whom Spilker allegedly made false
statements was named Doan, Dos, Don, or Daub, no evidence
was ever received that false statements were in fact made.
As regarding false statements having been made by Mr.
Spilker to the plaintiffs1 real estate agent, Mr. Neidert,
no evidence that the statements were false was presented.
Mr. Neidert only testified that Spilker questioned whether
he had a license to sell a mobile home, and that "[Spilker]
didn't want anybody selling mobile homes in there." (r. 372)
Mr. Neidert also testified that Spilker mentioned pending
legal matters, but also stated that until the day of the
trial he was never aware that there actually were legal
matters concerning the mobile home. (r. 377-79) None of what
Neidert testified Spilker said were false statements, nor
were they statements that could in anyway affect the
plaintiffs1 title to the mobile home. Since Spilker1s
statements were true they cannot constitute slander of
title. Cardon v. McConnell, supra; McNichols v. Conejos-K
Corp., supra.
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C. MALICE.
As to malice, statements made, even if false, cannot
constitute a slander, unless the statements were made
maliciously. Cardon v. McConnell, supra. Malice is an
essential ingredient in a claim of slander of title.
Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425, 611 P.2d 1119
(N.M. App. 1980).
Even if the statements had been false, the trial
judge found that there was no malice on the part of
defendant Spilker:
The court further finds that Mr. Spilker
interfered with the Basses1 effort to sell their
trailer home prior to November 1st, 1978, and !_
can make no finding that that was malicious,
willful, or wanton, (r. 601 emphasis added)
D. SPECIAL DAMAGES
No cause of action exists for slander of title absent
proper pleading and proof of special damage:
The rule is generally recognized that special
damage is a necessary element of a cause of
action for slander of title or disparagement of
goods or property and that the special damages
recoverable must be such as proximately flow
from the slander uttered. General damages are
not presumed to result from the disparagement or
defamation, and there could be no recovery if
resultant injury is not shown. 50 Am. Jur. 2d.
1065, Libel and Slander, section 546. See also
Jemez Properties, Inc. v. Locero, 94 N.M. 181,
608 P.2d 157, 162 (1980) ("[slpecial damages
must be pleaded as well as proved in a suit for
slander of title.")
11
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Utah law is in complete accord with the foregoing. In
Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra; the Utah Supreme Court
outlined the following as necessary elements to prove a
cause of slander of title:
Although the falsity of the statement and malice
or lack of the privilege to do so in the
disparagement of title are two important
elements in a suit for slander of title, a
plaintiff in a suit for slander of title, unlike
a plaintiff in a suit for libel and slander of
his person, cannot prevail unless he alleges and
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act
of the defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.,
supra at 958 (emphasis added)
In another slander of title case, Western States
Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316
at 318 (1966), this Court held that "[w]ithout an allegation
of special damage there can be no recovery on what is
alleged in the plaintiff's [complaint]." These examples show
that it is a well established rule that special damages must
be plead and proved in slander of title cases, fl[t]he gist
of the action [being] the special damage sustained." Cardon
v. McConnell, supra.
In the instant case the plaintiffs failed to plead and
prove special damages. The only claim in the plaintiffs'
complaint which remotely resembles one for special damages
is that "[p]laintiffs were unable to sell [their mobile
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home] and have been completely dispossessed thereof" (r. 6)
and that plaintiffs suffered the loss of certain personal
property. No other allegation of special damage can be
found. Regarding this claim for special damage for failure
to sell the mobile home, the trial court held that the
plaintiffs failed to adequately prove it resulted from the
defendants' actions:
Plaintiffs failed to establish with the required
degree of certainty that their failure to sell
the property and obtain the profit therefrom was
proximately caused by the defendants' actions,
and therefore no damages can be awarded to
compensate them for a lost sale. (r. 162)
Attorney's fees alone, absent special circumstances,
cannot constitute the special damages necessary to be proved
to find a slander. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra; and
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, supra.
In her conclusions of law the trial judge noted that
the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees based upon
the court's opinion in Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., supra.
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., the defendant filed for
record an instrument which unequivocably and indelibly
clouded and slandered the plaintiff's title. The lower court
awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees incurred in expunging
the cloud on his title as an element of special damage, and

13
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the Supreme Court affirmed. In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co,
because the slander of title was in written form and filed
for record against the plaintiff's title to the property,
the slander was continuing, and the plaintiff had no choice
but to bring an action to remove the cloud. The expenditure
of attorney's fees associated with such an action, the court
concluded, was a reasonably foreseeable special damage which
resulted from the defendant's conduct.
The present case is completely distinguishable because
the plaintiffs were not required to bring this action to
expunge a continuing cloud on their title to the mobile
home. Indeed, they did not bring this action to expunge a
cloud on their title at all.
E. FAILURE TO PLEAD OR PURSUE A CLAIM FOR SLANDER OF TITLE
The final, and the most perplexing point of all, is that
neither the term "slander of title" nor the concept of "slander
of title" was even mentioned in the pleadings or throughout the
trial, including the closing arguments of counsel. In fact,
counsel for plaintiffs conceded in closing that plaintiffs were
alleging only the causes of action as originally in the
complaint, (r. 583). Also, when Judge Durham, the trial
judge, made her initial findings, she made absolutely no
mention of "slander of title" (r. 600-610). The issue of
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slander of title did not even arise until Judge Durham
entered her ruling, (r. 120-122, 121). Obviously defense
counsel was surprised by the ruling and eventually objected
thereto, (r. 130) but even counsel for plaintiffs, in the
subsequent hearing on attorneyfs fees held before Judge
Fishier, conceded that he had never entertained the concept
of slander of title in -the lawsuit, (r. 616) As a result,
plaintiff did not press the issue of slander of title at the
trial, and consequently failed to present evidence
sufficient to justify a finding of slander of title.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFFS FOR THE 10 DAY PERIOD IN OCTOBER, 1978.
The trial court found that:
(3) ... [Spilker] committed a trespass,
conversion of, or forcible entry upon the
property for the period between October 20, 1978
and the date Trimbles "forfeited" (albeit
wrongfully) the plaintiffs contract. Plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment against Spilker's
employer, Planned Management Services, Inc., for
the reasonable rental value of the property for
the period of conversion or trespass, ...
(4) The reasonable rental value of the
property was the same amount being paid to
Valley Bank on Trimbles' mortgage. That amount
should be prorated to determine the amount of
judgment as set forth in Conclusion #2 about.
[#3 above.] (r. 162)
These conclusions of the trial court-are apparently
15
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These conclusions of the trial court are apparently
based upon the findings of fact that:
(4)(b). [Spilker] changed the locks on
the property on or about October 20, 1978,
without the plaintiff's consent or permission.
Removed the lockbox belonging to plaintiff's
realtor, thereby denying to plaintiffs and their
agent all access to the property. Made no tender
or delivery of, or effort to tender or deliver,
the keys to the new locks.
(5) Plaintiffs did not at any time
abandon or surrender the property. When they
moved out, it was with the intent to permit
their realtor to show the property and to sell
it in their behalf. They were entitled to
possession. There was no evidence of any intent
to abandon, and defendant Spilker's changing of
the locks was not in good faith, (r. 161)
The problem with the trial court's findings is that
they are not supported by the record, and in fact the record
indicates just the contrary. Granted, there was testimony by
plaintiffs about Spilker's attempts to get the plaintiffs to
list their mobile home for sale through him, and he may have
represented that there were pending legal problems with the
mobile home in light of the writ of restitution that had
been issued, but Mrs. Bass, herself, admitted in cross
examination that neither she nor her husband, nor anyone she
could identify, had actually been deprived access to the
home. She further indicated that neither she nor her husband
made any demand to enter the mobile home after the locks
were changed.
16
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Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] All right. Itfs
true, isn't it, that Mr. Spilker never told you
that you absolutely couldn't sell your mobile
home if you didn't list it with him? He never
told you that?
A. [Mrs. Bass] Not in those words,
no.
Q. He just tried to encourage you tolist it with him?
A. He told us that we needed to go
through him to sell it. Take it any way you want
to.
Q. You were never present when Mr.
Spilker or anyone ever, himself, ever prohibited
anyone from viewing your mobile home, were you?
A. I was present on the day with
Wally Neidert and the Daubs.
Q. Of course they were already in the
park and had gone through the mobile home?
A. As far as I know, they had already
gone through the mobile home.
Q. And you personally weren't present
or don't know, or your own personal knowledge,
of any incidents where anyone was prohibited
from seeing your mobile home?
A. No.
Q. You also have no knowledge or were
never present where you made demand to enter the
mobile home and refused [sic] to do that?
A. No. We were advised by Mr.
Ungricht not to do that.
Q. So your attorney told you not to
go back?
A. He told us not to contact Mr.
Spilker or anybody else and make demands to go
into the home after they changed the locks.
Q. I see. And so you never made any
demand after the locks were changed?
A. No. We left that in his hands. He
said he would take care of that.
Q. So you don't know whether you
could have or couldn't have gone back and picked
up your furnace and hot water heater, for
instance, personally?
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A. Personally, I guess not. I guess
I'd have to say I didn't make the demands, nor
my husband, (r. 411 - 413)
The testimony of Mr. Spilker is consistent with that
of Mrs. Bass:
Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] Now, Tommy, did
you ever tell either the guard or anyone else
associated with Planned Management not to allow
the Basses access to their mobile home?
A. No, sir. I was very careful in
that.
Q. Did you ever have any demand made
upon you by either Mr. or Mrs. Bass to enter
their mobile home?
A. Never.
Q. They never even asked you if they
could?
A. I never saw them, sir.
Q. How about after the locks were
changed? Did you ever have anybody request that
they be allowed to enter the mobile home?
A. Never.
Q. On behalf of the Basses?
A. No, sir.
Q. How about Mr. Neidert? Did you
ever deny him access to the mobile home?
A. No, sir. I told him to contact us,
and my wife was present. When I asked him to
take the signs out I told him to please contact
us, I told the guard to have him contact us day
or night, sir. That was instructions they had,
too, if he ever came in. (r. 456 - 457)
Mr. Neidert, who also testified on behalf of the
plaintiffs, admitted that he had never been denied access to
the mobile home after the locks were changed:
Q. [by Mr. Fillerup] All right. Thank
you. It's true, isn't it, Mr. Neidert, that you
personally were never denied access to the
mobile home when you requested it?
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A. Well, I never had to request it,
because I had a key to the place. But I was
denied when the key box was taken off.
Q. Temporarily?
A. I never got in after that.
Q. Did you ever demand to get in
after that?
A. I was kind of out of the picture
by that time.
Q. But did you ever demand to get in
like [after] that?
A. Not that I recall. I don't know. I
would doubt it. I don't know.
Q. You never went to Mr. Spilker
after the time the locks were changed and said,
"I want to get in there and show somebody that
mobile home"? You never did that, did you?
A. I honestly don't know.
Q. Prior to the time the locks were
changed, though, the guard or Mr. Spilker or
someone else never denied you any access,
stopped you at the entry and said, "I'm sorry,
but you can't go in there anyway"?
A. No. No one ever stopped me. But
they just tried to discourage me. (r. 383 - 384)
Mr. Bass testified that on one occasion the guard
told him that he had no business in the park and not to come
in, but he could not identify the date or whether it was
after the locks were chainged. (r. 275 - 277).
There is no question that Tommy Spilker changed the
locks on the coach on October 20, 1978. He testified that he
did so at the direction of Bob Baldwin, attorney for PMS. He
further testified that the reason for the lock change was
because he had to break off the old lock to move a water
heater and furnace inside that had been left behind by the
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Basses. He was concerned that the items had been left out
where they could be damaged or stolen, (r. 438 - 440).
The evidence presented by plaintiffs as to why Mr.
Spilker changed the locks concerned what Spilker may have
said to prospective buyers and Mr. Neidert, the inference
being that he changed the locks to prevent a sale of the
mobile home. Howeverf absolutely no evidence was ever
offered to show that Spilker or PMS ever denied plaintiffs,
Mr. Neidert, or prospective purchasers any access to the
mobile home. In fact, Spilker testified that he went to Mr.
Neidert's office after the locks were changed to inform
Neidert of what he had done. (r. 457a - 458).
The court concluded, however, that by changing the
locks Spilker denied to plaintiffs and their agent all
access to the property. Such conclusion is not supported by
any evidence, and is clearly in error.
Juxtaposed to the above problem is the fact that a
writ of restitution had issued in favor of PMS against the
plaintiffs in July of 1978, and that some 20 days before the
locks were changed, plaintiffs had moved from the premises.
Could Spilker have unlawfully detained the plaintiffs from
the property when they were not possessing or attempting to
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possess it and when they had no right to possess it in the
first place?
The finding by the trial court that PMS is
responsible to plaintiffs for the trespass, conversion, or
unlawful detainer is simply not supported by any evidence
adduced at trial and as a result the judgment against PMS
should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
The courtfs finding of slander of title is
erroneous, both in law and fact, was never plead or tried by
plaintiffs, and appears to be an afterthought of the trial
court to find a way to award attorney's fees to plaintiffs,
even though the court found no actual damage had occurred. As
a result, the award of attorneyfs fees must be set aside.
Additionally, the award of damages for trespass, conversion
or unlawful detainer is erroneous. This Court should reverse
the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor
of defendant PMS, no cause of action.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1983.

Quo. ftL?
-

ROBERT C. F I L L E R U P ]
Attorney for Appellants
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